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In Defense of the
"Ordinary" / "Extraordinary" Distinction
Richard 0 'N ell

The author, an assistant professor of philosophy at Emory and
Henry College, Emory, Virginia, explains that his paper "defends the
traditional doctrine against a recent proposal by Robert M. Veatch in
his popular Death, Dying, and the Biological Revolution."
Discussions and policy statements on the ethics of the cessation of
life-prolonging medical care often refer to the distinction between
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" treatment. Briefly, the idea is that
while it is never justified to cease ordinary measures, the use of extraordinary means is morally optional. Unfortunately, "ordinary" and
"extraordinary" are vague and potentially misleading, and many believe we ought to speak instead simply of morally required and expendable means, or their equivalents. In addition to this terminological change, Robert M. Veatch proposes a susbstantive shift from the
traditional doctrine in his recent book, Death, Dying, and the Biological Revolution. 1 He suggests that we adopt the "language of reasonableness" and "patient's perspective," and from those perspectives ask
"What treatments is it reasonable to refuse?"
I believe Veatch's proposal is defective. It arises from a failure to
keep distinct two questions: 1) What are the obligations of doctors
and patients regarding the use of life-prolonging treatment?; 2) When
does a patient have a right to refuse treatment? The language of
reasonableness is proper in answering the first but not the second
question. The converse is true of the patient's perspective. Veatch
attempts to answer both questions from a combination of the two
perspectives. The result is a proposal which requires the physician to
ignore the burdens a patient's treatment may have on others and
restricts the patient's right to refuse treatment. Furthermore, there is
an interpretation of the traditional doctrine which permits the appropriate use of the two perspectives. This paper therefore defends the
traditional view against Veatch's alternative.
Pope Pius XII's 1957 address to a group of anesthesiologists expresses the traditional doctrine. 2 It asserts, first of all, the general
right and duty of all persons, and physicians in particular, to preserve
life and health. One has this duty "toward himself, toward God,
toward the human community, and in most cases toward certain
determined persons." One's duty, however, is limited. "But normally
one is held to use only ordinary means, according to circumstances of
persons, places, times, and culture, that is to say, means that do not
involve any grave burden for oneself or another." Doctor and patient
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each have the general right to use extraordinary means, but normally
neither is obligated to do so. For example, an anesthesiologist has the
right to use a respirator in completely hopeless cases, but "he is not
bound to do so."
We may interpret the Pope's remarks here in terms of the language
of reasonableness . The physician and patient are required to use treatment only when it is reasonable to do so. A respirator may be reasonable for a polio victim but unreasonable for an irreversibly comatose
person. The reasonableness of a treatment may be determined by
reference to the standard, frequently used in the law, of the "reasonable man ." A measure is reasonable if it is acceptable to the reasonable
person. The reasonable person, according to the traditional view,
would find a treatment unacceptable if it is either not useful in treating a patient's condition or creates significant burdens for the patient
or others.
In contrast, what is required of doctors and patients according to
Veatch's proposal is "what the patients would find reasonable (in
cases where they are competent) and what the reasonable man would
find reasonable (when the patient is not competent)." Though the
language of reasonableness is used here, the emphasis is on the patient's perspective. For competent patients can have or refuse any
treatment so long as they can offer "reasons valid to themselves." An
in the case of incompetent patients, objections to treatment are to bt
considered only if they are patient-centered, i.e ., based on burdens i'
will cause the patient. Consequently, a physician has an obligation to
provide treatment for a competent patient whenever he requests it and
for an incompetent patient whenever a reasonable person would consider it in the best interests of the patient.
Is this what we want to say? Are there not cases in which the
burdens for others are so severe as to require the physician not to
treat? Consider a patient who requests treatment which in the doctor"
judgment will produce no benefit and which will place the patin'
family in debt for years. Or a patient who demands the only space in
the intensive care unit when there are other patients more likely to
benefit from it. In Veatch 's view the doctor is obligated to accede to
these requests. But this seems wrong, and it is because we believe the
legitimate interests of others are relevant to determining a physician's
obligations. The patient-centered perspective, by excluding the interests of others (except to the extent that they are among the patient's
concerns), fails in this regard.
Patient's Obligations
The patient-centered perspective also yields counter-intuitive judgments concerning the patient's obligations. On Veatch's view competent patients are only morally required to use those measures they
themselves find reasonable. That is, they not only have the right to
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refuse any treatment to which they object, but it is never wrong for
them to do so. This conflicts with our belief that it is sometimes
wrong to refuse treatment even when one believes the treatment
would be personally burdensome. We may want to grant the Christian
Scientist the right to refuse a blood transfusion, but this does not
entail that the refusal is the morally right decision. By insisting that it
is wrong for a patient to decline ordinary or reasonable measures , the
traditional doctrine supports our belief that the subjective decisions of
patients do not possess the power to make treatments right or wrong.
What does the traditional view say concerning the patient's right to
refuse treatment? According to the Pope, "The doctor, in fact has no
separate and independent right where the patient is concerned. In
general he can take action only if the patient explicitly or implicitly ,
directly or indirectly, gives him permission." The patient has a general
obligation to himself and others to receive ordinary treatment, i.e ., it
would be wrong for him to refuse it. But the doctor has no right to
impose any treatment, ordinary or extraordinary, against the patient's
wishes. In other words, the patient has no obligation to the physician.
If, therefore, the patient wishes to violate his duty to preserve his life
and health by refusing treatment, the doctor must let him. Thus the
traditional doctrine takes a completely patient-centered view of the
g ght to refuse treatment.
For Veatch, on the other hand, it is not sufficient, apparently, that
" competent patient expresses a desire not to be treated. Reasons must
also be offered, though only "reasons valid to themselves." This is
~bviously an attempt to join together the requirements of reasonableness and patient-centeredness. But the notion of a "reason valid to
oneself" is either redundant or nonsensical. What could possibly count
as a reason seriously offered by a patient which was not valid to
himself? Moreover, why should we require that reasons be given at all?
It should be sufficient that a competent patient state his sincere desire
1) t to be treated. Respect for a person's autonomy demands that we
~e ifect his wishes not to be treated whatever the grounds for the
refusal.
The overemphasis on reasonableness also appears in Veatch's discussion of refusals for incompetent patients. For them, he adopts the
"reasonable man" standard. In acting as agents for those incapable of
making their own decisions we are to ask whether the reasonable
person would consider refusal of treatment acceptable.
Unfortunately, this approach is not as patient-centered as it
appears. For what the reasonable person would find acceptable may
differ from what the incompetent patient would choose if he were
able. That is, it is one thing to act as a patient's agent and decide for
him what is in his best interests. It is quite another to adopt the
patient's perspective, based on what one knows of his past expressed
wishes and interests, and choose that course which one believes would
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be the patient's choice. The former, "reasonable man," standard is
appropriate in determining the reasonableness of a treatment. The
latter, "surrogate agent," standard is proper if one is concerned to
protect the incompetent patient's right of refusal.
Implications of Standards
The reasonable man and surrogate agent standards have different
implications for the choice of a patient's agent. On the surrogate agent
model the presumption is that decisions concerning cessation of treatment should be made by an incompetent's family. The family is most
likely to be familiar with his past expressed wishes and interests. They
are to judge as the patient would judge. This is the Pope's view. "The
rights and duties of the family depend upon the presumed will of the
unconscious patient."
The reasonable man standard does not create the same presumption. For the patient's family may not be the best judge of what the
reasonable person would decide is in the patient's best interests. In
fact, a case could be made that the best judge is the physician, though
this clearly is not Veatch's intention. The physician, after all, is most
aware of the medical facts, the chances of recovery, and how similar
cases have been decided.
Which model, reasonable man or surrogate agent, should be adopted
for the incompetent patient? Well, if a thoroughly patient-centered
approach is correct for the competent patient, I see no reason that it
should not be correct for the incompetent patient. Incompetent persons
have the same rights to autonomy as competent persons. The only
difference is that incompetents must exercise their autonomy by
proxy. Since the surrogate agent standard is more patient-centered
than the reasonable man standard, it is the proper approach. And it,
we have seen, is the standard endorsed by the traditional view.
I have not argued that the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
are the most appropriate to use in distinguishing life-prolonging measures which one has an obligation to use from those which are optional.
Perhaps it would be better to adopt the language of required and
expendable means. However, one should be careful that in exchanging
terminology the substantive doctrine associated with the original
language is not abandoned for a less adequate replacement. If my
reasoning is correct, Robert Veatch's proposal is no improvement on
the traditional doctrine and, in fact, represents a step backward.
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